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DOES DIRECT DEMOCRACY MATTER
FOR POLITICAL PARTIES?
An Empirical Test in the Swiss Cantons
Andreas Ladner and Michael Brändle
A B S T R A C T
According to most political scientists and commentators, direct
democracy seems to weaken political parties. Our empirical analysis in
the 26 Swiss cantons shows that this thesis in its general form cannot
be maintained. Political parties in cantons with extensive use of refer-
endums and initiatives are not in all respects weaker than parties in
cantons with little use of direct democratic means of participation. On
the contrary, direct democracy goes together with more professional and
formalized party organizations. Use of direct democracy is associated
with more fragmented and volatile party systems, and with greater
support for small parties, but causal interpretations of these relation-
ships are difficult.
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Direct democracy has become more and more popular in the last few years.1
Especially since the 1970s the use of referendums has increased (Kobach,
1993: 4ff.; Butler and Ranney, 1994: 5)2 and a growing number of voices
describe direct democracy as a panacea for increasing disenchantment with
politics, politicians and political parties.3 Accordingly, questions concerning
the influence of direct democracy on different elements of the political
system and on the political culture have become of vital interest.
Switzerland provides an excellent laboratory for analysing these ques-
tions. It is not only the country with the most far-reaching possibilities for
direct democracy but is also, at least on a national level, the world leader
in the use of direct democracy (Trechsel and Kriesi, 1996: 185): from its
foundation in 1848 until the end of 1996 not less than 433 ballot issues
have been put forward nationwide. That is more than all other countries
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combined since the emergence of the modern nation-state (Kobach, 1996:
98). And, due to the Swiss federalist structure with 26 quite different and
politically autonomous cantons, there are considerable differences in regard
to both the practice of direct democracy and various aspects of the political
systems and the political culture. Surprisingly, there has up to now been little
thorough research regarding the impact of direct democracy upon the politi-
cal system (Kobach, 1993: 7) and political processes. This is especially true
as far as empirical studies are concerned.4
This paper deals with the interrelations between direct democracy and
different variables concerning political parties and the party system, sub-
sumed under the term ‘party strength’. In particular, it tries to answer the
question of whether direct democracy weakens political parties, as the
majority of observers of direct democracy in the American states and in
Switzerland tend to argue (Budge, 1996: 120).
Direct Democracy and Political Parties: The Traditional View
Despite the lack of empirical research and results, there is astonishingly wide
agreement among political scientists and observers about the influence of
direct democracy on political parties and the party system: direct democ-
racy basically seems to weaken political parties, although it might have some
minor positive effects on parties as well. However, most of these obser-
vations are based on the national level. In Switzerland, national-level parties
resemble umbrella organizations, lacking financial resources and having
difficulties putting forward a coherent political profile and ensuring the
support of all the cantonal sections. And it is precisely this organizational
weakness at a national level that is very often more or less directly implied
when the various authors refer to weak Swiss parties. 
One set of arguments finds its roots in the work of Gruner (1964, 1977,
1984) and is based on the aspects of mobilization of voters and of party
ties. According to Gruner (1984: 149), direct democracy, among all insti-
tutional characteristics of the Swiss political system, has been of the utmost
importance to political parties. Nevertheless, the influence has been
ambiguous: direct democracy seems to be responsible for the early emer-
gence as well as for the relative weakness of Swiss political parties. Parties
are commonly called ‘children of democratic rights’ (Kinder der Volks-
rechte) as their formation is strongly connected with the successful claim
for direct democratic rights; that is, the general and direct elections, the
constitutional and legislative referendum, and the constitutional initiative.
The oldest political parties were founded in those cantons that already knew
early forms of the referendum – the popular veto or the right of recall
(Gruner, 1964: 273).5 But direct democracy also allows party leaders to
mobilize a large number of their supporters rapidly and without great
effort, because these supporters are ready to be mobilized for ideological
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reasons anyway when controversial political questions are at stake. Political
parties are therefore not forced to build up a strong organizational structure
with highly committed adherents. They can rely on a small cadre not falling
back into lethargy after a ballot campaign and mobilizing the masses again
when necessary (Gruner, 1977: 27f.). Therefore, in the eyes of Gruner, it is
not a paradox that the Swiss political parties were among the first mass or
popular parties and at the same time only created weak party organizations. 
Another set of arguments considers the role of political parties in the
decision-making process at different stages and the importance of other
intermediary organizations. Some of the reasoning can be traced back to the
work of Neidhart (1970). In a direct democratic system the possibility of
blocking any decision by questioning the government’s proposals through a
referendum makes thorough negotiation between the various interests
involved absolutely necessary. It is basically the threat of a referendum that
can endanger a carefully arranged compromise after its deliberation in
parliament that has fundamentally changed Swiss democracy from a true
plebiscitarian democracy to one characterized by negotiation. Here, it is not
the political parties but the generally much more homogenous interest
groups that play a crucial role in the increasingly important pre-parlia-
mentary process of negotiation, as well as during a referendum. Or, in the
words of Neidhart (1986: 43): direct democracy demonopolizes and defunc-
tionalizes political parties as much as the process of interest articulation;
opposition and legitimacy of decision follow an independent logic. Beyme
(1982: 228) also argues, with a special nod to Switzerland, that the Refer-
endumsdemokratie has favoured interest organizations rather than political
parties. In the course of a campaign, interest organizations mobilize for a
ballot more efficiently than political parties, which have to pay attention to
their consociational partners in the cartel of political representation.
Among the more recent publications, Kobach (1993: 122) seems particu-
larly convinced about the negative impact of direct democracy upon Swiss
political parties. He states that ‘all four governing parties rose to power by
taking a formidable dose of direct democracy. Although the injection
worked, the continuing presence of the drug has left the parties substantially
weakened’. According to Kobach, the parties’ role has diminished with
regard to the expression of issue preferences to the electorate, the aggre-
gation of interests, and the setting of political agendas.
Budge (1996: 120–4) is much more positive about the impact of direct
democracy on political parties, maintaining that many of the arguments
about weakening effects are contradictory and quite often based on the
effects on dominant parties. For him, the vitalizing effect on party systems
and on the emergence of new parties or new issues, which enforce the
responsiveness of established parties, are usually underestimated.
The bulk of arguments postulating the negative effects of direct democracy
on political parties in general or at least upon the parties in power can be
summarized in four points.
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• Competition: Direct democracy fosters competition with governing politi-
cal parties by aiding political pressure groups and new and oppositional
parties. Since direct democracy allows political groups to move the masses
more easily, political parties no longer monopolize politics. Social move-
ments, single-issue and interest groups are also able to influence the politi-
cal agenda directly. These groups even have some advantages over
political parties (Kriesi, 1986: 338; Möckli, 1994: 234). Because the
political system needs to find a broadly acceptable consensus, interest
groups are much more directly integrated into the pre-parliamentary
process, and are financially stronger. And it is easier for single-issue
groups to use direct democracy to promote a clear-cut political position
than it is for the ideologically less focused political parties. Whereas the
political parties in general are threatened by other political groups, the
established political parties are additionally threatened by new and oppo-
sitional parties since direct democracy makes it easier for them to enter
the political system and put forward their demands.
• Conflict: Direct democracy induces conflicts between political parties in
various ways. First of all, they are constantly forced to decide on specific
issues. A party is thus continuously tested as to whether or not it sticks to
its principles and its party programme. It must make considerable efforts
to justify its position on ballot issues to voters as well as to its own rank
and file. Since most of the parties are heterogeneous and weakly organized,
consisting of rather autonomous cantonal sections, concrete decisions on
political issues also create the potential for intra-party conflict (see also
Möckli, 1994: 234). For example, it is not uncommon for cantonal parties
to take a different stand from their national affiliates (Gruner and Hertig,
1983: 125; Hug, 1994: 89). Here, the argument is easy to make that Swiss
political parties are rather weak because they are unable to agree on certain
decisions.6 Party organizations need a democratic or at least legitimate
process of decision-making, which might weaken their ability to operate.
• Extra work: Confronted with a growing number of ballots, political
parties only play a minor role (Gruner, 1984: 150). Without strong
organizational ties they lack financial resources, know-how and volun-
teers. Compared to other countries, direct democracy imposes extra work
on the Swiss political parties.7 Since the parties lack money and pro-
fessional staff, they are unable to take the lead on every ballot issue.
Because of their more general orientations, parties are forced to deal with
all propositions, whereas interest groups only concentrate on questions
within their specific field of concern. This point, of course, is directly
related to the financial situation of the Swiss parties, and would lose much
of its explanatory power if the parties were given enough resources.
• Annihilation – party intermediation becomes obsolete: The political
culture of direct democracy makes the organization of society into parties
more difficult and fosters genuine anti-party feelings (Neidhart, 1986:
43). This argument is supported by the fact that elections in Switzerland
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have a low and decreasing turnout and are considered of lesser import-
ance. It does not really matter who gets elected, as the citizens do not lose
control over important political decisions.
Political parties are also said to gain some advantages from the system of
direct democracy:
• Openness of the political system: A direct democratic system favours new
and smaller political parties (see, for example, Papadopoulos, 1991, 1996;
Möckli, 1994: 239) and new political ideas.8 This is a plus as long new-
comers do not lead the party system to collapse, but rather stimulate politi-
cal competition. Opposition to the government may also be absorbed and
productively channelled into accepted forms of political participation. For
non-governmental parties, direct democracy offers a well-defined way of
interest articulation. The referendum in particular enables smaller parties,
which in majority elections have little chance of gaining a seat, to remain
influential. They can use the threat of a referendum to blackmail a govern-
ing coalition, or can use direct democracy to keep their issues on the politi-
cal agenda even if their electoral success is fading. Thus, direct democracy
supports the survival of the smaller parties (Gruner, 1964: 282). But it is
not only the smaller and oppositional parties that might take advantage of
direct democracy. Direct democracy also constantly forces the established
parties to deal with new issues. Political parties may thus be more respon-
sive and therefore better able to cope with social change.
• Platform: Direct democracy gives the parties a good opportunity to put
forward their political ideas. Three or four times a year they are offered
a platform (see for example Neidhart, 1986: 43). Their positions are
reported in all newspapers and their leaders frequently appear on tele-
vision. This platform effect is somewhat diminished by the large number
of parties involved in the Swiss multi-party system, as well by the fact that
members of a single party are sometimes found on both the pro- and
contra-committees. But it works most effectively when one single party
stands against all the others, or at least takes a special position among its
usual coalition partners.9
• Helps parties maintaining a high level of political activity: Because of direct
democracy, Swiss political parties are constantly forced to remain at a rela-
tively high level of political activity. It is not only once every 4 years that
the parties have to become active, but throughout the year; decisions have
to be taken, information meetings have to be organized and party ideo-
logical points of view have to be applied. Party headquarters might profit
from the frequent ballots to keep in contact with their branches and
organizations on lower political levels. And campaigning might be a good
opportunity for mobilizing members and bringing the parties’ principles to
the people. However, Swiss parties’ constant lack of resources weakens
these positive effects on their internal mobilization. And, as the money
raised for a ballot campaign usually goes to the ballot committee and not
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to the party’s office, the mobilization potential and the degree of activity
cannot be easily transformed into constant organizational strength.
• Pressure relief valve in a consociational system: The last positive effect on
political parties attributed to direct democracy is closely connected to the
Swiss consensus system. As all the important parties are usually integrated
into the government, initiatives and referendums play the role of a ‘pres-
sure relief valve’. It is not uncommon that a governmental party organizes
a referendum against a law that was put forward and supported by its
party members in government. Although this is usually criticized as a lack
of loyalty, there is hardly any reason why a coalition party should abstain
from doing so occasionally. Initiatives and referendums enable govern-
mental parties to act independently of the parties they share power with
and this can help to break the chains of consociationalism. It also reduces
the pressure on the voters to defect from their parties over particular issues.
It is very difficult to weigh up all these arguments to estimate the effective
influence of direct democracy upon political parties. Although many politi-
cal scientists express a rather mystifying sympathy for the ‘direct-democ-
racy-weakens-political-parties-thesis’, clearly what is needed is empirical
testing of these supposed effects.
Measuring Direct Democracy and Party Strength
As already mentioned, in federal Switzerland the national level is not appro-
priate for testing the influence of direct democracy on party strength. The
26 Swiss cantons provide a much more favourable empirical setting, differ-
ing quite considerably in terms of parties and in terms of patterns of direct
democracy. But before we are able to empirically address the question of
whether direct democracy goes hand in hand with weak political parties, we
need a measure for direct democracy that can be applied in the cantons, and
we also have to define ‘party strength’.
Classifying cantons according to the degree of direct democracy is a
contested issue. Three basic approaches are possible: to consider the sheer
availability of direct democratic instruments, the accessibility of these instru-
ments, or the degree to which they are used. A first group of classifications
is based on institutional provisions for direct democracy. The more different
forms of direct democracy and the wider the range of issues to be resolved
by direct democratic means, the more directly democratic the canton. Thus,
for many political scientists and commentators the German-speaking part of
Switzerland is considered more directly democratic than the French- and
Italian-speaking parts (see for example Linder, 1991: 50, 1994: 85; Kriesi,
1995: 87). This is partly justified. On the communal level, for example, the
French- and Italian-speaking communities favour a parliament, and thus a
representative system, and the German-speaking communities a communal
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assembly – a direct democratic legislative system (see Ladner, 1991: 81 ff.).10
These preferences also hold for the cantonal level. The German-speaking
canton of Zurich, for example, is supposed in this view to be more directly
democratic than many others, since it permits the ‘citizens initiative’
(Einzelinitiative), by which every citizen can launch an initiative when he or
she is able to gain the support of 60 of the 180 members of parliament (see
Moser, 1985: 52).11
The work of Weck-Hannemann and Pommerehne (1996), which covers
direct democratic decision-making on fiscal issues, also belongs to this group
of classifications. Here, direct democratic cantons are those in which citizens
have to approve the tax rate and where the executive or parliament do not
alone decide on the budget (see Feld and Savioz, 1996: 6).12 In such a view
the canton of Zurich does not belong to the group of direct democratic
cantons because the tax rate does not have to be approved by the citizens.
Institutional provisions may also distinguish a further group of cantons –
those that still know the Landsgemeinde (Glaris, Obwalden, Nidwalden,
Appenzell-AR, Appenzell-IR).13 The Landsgemeinde is a cantonal meeting
of all citizens to decide cantonal law-making, elections of judges, the setting
of income tax rates and cantonal spending.14 Here it is obvious that politi-
cal parties play a minor role from the beginning and the question is whether
these cantons should be treated as special cases or as cantons with the most
far-reaching direct democratic facilities.15
The institutional possibility of using means of direct democracy is one
thing, the conditions under which they can be used is another. What is the
point of theoretically having a wide range of possibilities when it is almost
impossible to use them because the hurdles are too high? The second group
of classifications is thus based on the ‘entry price’ of direct democracy. This
can be measured in terms of the number of signatures required for consti-
tutional initiatives, legislative initiatives and optional referendums as a per-
centage of the electorate, and the number of days given for the collection of
the required signatures (see, for example, Kriesi and Wisler, 1996: 24).16
A third and final approach looks at the use of direct democracy. Direct
democratic cantons are those where the citizens have to decide frequently
on ballot issues caused by an initiative or an optional referendum.17 The
mandatory (obligatory) referendum can be left aside, as it is mainly due to
institutional provisions and has little to do with the political actors involved. 
Until now, little statistical evidence has been put forward that in cantons
with high ‘entry hurdles’ (in terms of the absolute number of signatures
required, the number of signatures in relation to the number of voters, or
the time allowed for collection of signatures) referendums or initiatives are
used less (Linder, 1994: 88). Our data (see Table 1) also show that there is
no strong correlation18 between the use of direct democracy and the entry
hurdles or institutional provisions (i.e. the facilities enabling citizens to
decide on fiscal issues or the language area).19 Strong correlations do exist
between entry hurdles and institutional differences, such as the possibility
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of deciding on fiscal issues and the differences between the language areas.
In other words: German-speaking cantons have more direct democratic
facilities for deciding on fiscal issues and the entry price for using direct
democracy is lower.
For our empirical analyses we work with the effective use of direct democ-
racy, measured as the number of initiatives and optional referendums voted
on between 1991 and 1996. In other words, we consider political reality to
be more important than mere institutional availability in regard to antici-
pated effects on political parties and the party system. Why should the sheer
possibility of direct democratic participation weaken the political parties
when there are no political actors able or willing to use them? The only poss-
ible argument against this would have to use Neidhart’s reasoning that at
the pre-parliamentary stage of decision-making the threat of a referendum
is most effective when it does not come to a referendum. This might be
partly true, but only holds for referendums and does not account for initia-
tives. Furthermore, every threat loses its power when there are signs that it
cannot be carried out. We are aware, however, that one consequence of
employing a usage variable is that we can be less sure about the causality of
the relation between direct democracy and party strength.20
There are a few other variables expected to have an influence on both
political parties and the use of direct democracy. Such variables include: the
size of the canton (inhabitants), the average size of the communities in a
canton, the number of communities in a canton, the degree of urbanization
and the language area (German- or French- and Italian-speaking cantons).
As is shown in Table 2, urbanization and larger community size, and to a
lesser extent larger cantonal size, are associated with a greater use of initia-
tives and referendums. For our test we therefore have to control at least for
urbanization and the average size of communities.
The Swiss party system offers, as already mentioned, almost ideal con-
ditions for empirical analyses. As a consequence of the federalist structure
Swiss parties are strongly rooted at the local and cantonal level. There are
PA R T Y  P O L I T I C S  5 ( 3 )
290
Table 1. Different classifications of direct democracy (Pearson correlation
coefficients)
Use Hurdles Finance Language a
Use of direct democracy .16 .06 –.08
Entry hurdles .16 .42 .65
Institution: finance issues .06 .42 .29
Institutions: German- vs French/Italian-
speaking cantons –.08 .65 .29
a 0 = German; i.e. ZH, BE, LU, UR, SZ, OW, NW, GL, ZG, SO, BS, BL, SH, AR, AI, SG, GR,
AG and TG.
1 = French/Italian; i.e. FR, TI, VD, VS, NE, GE, JU.
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more than 150 parties and political groups at the cantonal level, and nearly
6000 at the local level (Ladner, 1996: 134). Their number, kind and import-
ance vary from canton to canton and it is not uncommon to speak of 26
different cantonal party systems within the country. Hence, whether or not
direct democracy goes hand in hand with weak political parties is an empiri-
cal question. 
Much of the problem in judging how direct democracy affects political
parties is the lack of clear concepts for evaluating party strength (Budge,
1996: 121). The term ‘party strength’ contains different elements, including
party organization, the influence of political parties and the party system as
a whole. For our empirical evaluation we propose using nine different
variables which are more or less linked to the idea of party strength.21 The
nine variables measured either at the cantonal or the local level can be
divided into three groups:
1 Strength of party organization:
• formalized party membership (percentage of local party organizations
applying formal membership criteria and being able to distinguish
between party members and adherents);
• percentage of communities having organized political parties;
• professionalization of party organizations (paid party staff);
• party membership within the cantons (percentage of party members in the
electorate).
2 Influence of parties:
• percentage of local councillors affiliated with a party;
• influence of local political parties according to communal secretaries.
3 Shape of the party system:
• fractionalization (Rae Index);
• volatility (based on the percentage of seats in the cantonal parliament);
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Table 2. ‘Control variables’ and direct democracy (Pearson correlation
coefficients)
Use of direct democracy
Number of communities .11
Average size of communitites .72
Size of the canton .41
Urbanizationa .70
Languageb .08
a 0 = rural cantons; i.e. UR, SZ, OW, NW, GL, FR, SO, SH, AR, AI, GR, AG, TG, VS, NE and
JU.
1 = urban cantons; i.e. ZH, BE, LU, ZG, BS, BL, SG, TI, VD, GE.
b 0 = German-speaking; i.e. ZH, BE, LU, UR, SZ, OW, NW, GL, ZG, SO, BS, BL, SH, AR, AI,
SG, GR, AG and TG.
1 = French/Italian-speaking; i.e. FR, TI, VD, VS, NE, GE, JU.
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Table 3. Control variables and ‘party strength’ (Pearson correlation coefficients)
Party affili- Perceived Strength of non-
Formal- Local party Professional- Party ates in local party governmental Fractional-
Variable ization organizations ization membership executives influence parties ization Volatility
No. of communitites .03 –.34 .06 .03 –.36 –.29 –.03 .30 –.14
Size of communities .47 .30 .53 –.15 .29 .46 .65 .30 .57
Size of canton .32 .02 .37 .09 –.08 .06 .31 .41 .28
Urbanization .36 .22 .60 –.05 .15 .32 .47 .37 .51
Language area –.36 –.20 .06 –.23 –.24 –.14 .09 .06 .18
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• influence of smaller parties (percentage of seats of ‘non-governmental’
parties in cantonal parliament; i.e. all parties except FDP, CVP, SVP, SPS
and LPS).
The four variables measuring the organizational strength of a party are
rather independent from each other (see Appendix, Table A1). An impor-
tant correlation exists only between the degree of formalization and party
membership. On the other hand, the two variables measuring the influence
of political parties in a canton are strongly linked. The percentage of party-
affiliated local councillors is positively associated with the influence of
political parties as perceived by communal secretaries. Both variables are
also positively associated with the percentage of communities with local
party organization. The latter is also significantly connected with the degree
of professionalization. 
The three party system variables also correlate with each other. The higher
the percentage of seats held by ‘non-governmental parties’, the more frac-
tionalized and volatile the party system is, while fractionalization and
volatility are themselves positively correlated. Basically, a higher degree of
formalization and professionalization goes together with a higher percent-
age of seats for non-governmental parties and high fractionalization and
volatility. The two variables measuring party influence seem not to be con-
nected with the party systems variables.
Table 3 includes other variables expected to have an influence on political
parties as well as on direct democracy: the size of the canton (inhabitants),
the average size of the communities in a canton, the number of communities
in a canton, the degree of urbanization, and the language (German- or
French/Italian-speaking cantons). Again, the average size of the communities
and the degree of urbanization correlate highly with some of the variables
measuring party strength. The others seem to be of lesser influence.
Direct Democracy and Party Strength: Some Empirical Evidence
This final section brings the use of direct democracy and party strength
together. Table 4 shows the results for each group of party strength variables
and controls for the average size of communities and for the degree of urban-
ization. As far as organizational party strength is concerned, two aspects are
positively connected with the use of direct democracy: formalization of party
organization and professionalization of party staff. Both correlations remain
positive even when controlling for the average size of communities, the
degree of urbanization or both together. All these correlation coefficients
show the reverse of what is expected by those who support the thesis that
direct democracy goes hand in hand with weak political parties, at least as
far as organization is concerned. Political parties are stronger in terms of for-
malized membership and professionalization in cantons that are more
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directly democratic or, according to our concept of direct democracy, where
direct democracy is used more often. Since there is no important correlation
between the formalization of party membership and professionalization (see
Appendix), two different types of party seem likely to go together with an
intensive use of direct democracy: a more member-orientated mass party and
a more modern electoral professional party. 
On the other hand, in cantons where direct democracy is used more often
parties have comparatively fewer members and fewer local sections. If we
remember Gruner’s argument that direct democracy prevents political parties
from building up strong organizational structures with highly committed
adherents, these results show that he was at least partly wrong. Nevertheless,
we might share his reasoning without accepting his conclusion about the
negative influence on party strength. The more referendums and initiatives are
used, the more often the masses have to be moved. It is apparently more
efficient for the parties to have mobilization done by professional party staff.
The more ballots are put forward, the more likely a party will try to employ
a full-time party secretary. And if parties have to decide on ballot issues fre-
quently and do it in a democratic manner, they favour a clear criterion like
formalized membership stating exactly who is entitled to take part in the
intra-party decision process and who is not. But direct democracy does not
have a mobilizing effect for the parties. It does not help them to increase
membership figures or to enlarge their network of local branches. Of course,
with all these relations the causation is not very clear. It can also be argued
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Table 4. Use of direct democracy and strength of party organization
Controlled
Initiatives Controlled for size of
and for average Controlled communities
referendums size of for and
1991–6 commune urbanization urbanization
Variable (Pearson corr.) (Partial corr.) (Partial corr.) (Partial corr.)
Strength of party organization
Formalized membership .56 .34 .47 .26
Percentage of local
party organizations .11 –.28 –.28 –.47
Professionalization .74 .55 .54 .33
Party membership –.16 –.15 –.22 –.17
Influence of parties
Percentage of local councillors
affiliated to parties .05 –.31 –.10 –.45
Influence of political parties .30 –.25 .05 –.48
Shape of the party system
Percentage of seats held by
‘non-governmental parties’ .85 .72 .82 .69
Fractionalization .63 .64 .56 .63
Volatility .78 .66 .69 .56
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that it is the other way round, with well-organized parties launching more ini-
tiatives and referendums. In any case, however, this evidence shows that direct
democracy does not go together with weak party organization in general.
Let us now turn to the relationship between direct democracy and party
influence on politics. Here again, the expected relation is not immediately
evident. Political parties are neither significantly weaker nor stronger than in
cantons with greater use of direct democracy. But if we control for the
average size of the communities and urbanization, direct democracy does
seem to correspond with less influence for political parties. Of course, it can
be argued that the number of seats held by political parties in local govern-
ment or the perceived influence of parties in the eyes of communal secretaries
are inadequate variables for measuring the influence of political parties in a
canton. Admittedly, it would be best to include measures of party influence
throughout the whole political process (policy formulation, parliamentary
and governmental decisions, executive action, etc.). Still, we are inclined to
rely on these data since it seems unlikely that parties are at the same time
very much present and influential in the communities without having any
influence in cantonal politics. And again, we cannot be sure about the cau-
sation of this relation. It remains an open question, whether direct democ-
racy is used more frequently in some communities because there are no
influential parties, or whether the parties lack influence because they are side-
lined by direct democracy.
Finally, let us look at the correlations between direct democracy and
different elements of the cantonal party systems. Here, all correlations are
strong, remaining so when controlled for by the average size of communi-
ties, the degree of urbanization and both. The fact that all three correlations
are found to be important is not astonishing, since all three variables
describing the party system are strongly intercorrelated (see Appendix). Fre-
quent use of direct democracy goes together with a high percentage of seats
held by smaller parties and a fractionalized and volatile party system. These
results support various authors’ assertions about the positive influence of
direct democracy on new, smaller and oppositional parties (see above).
Direct democracy makes a political system more open to new and opposi-
tional parties. The question here is whether this really should be described
as weakening the political parties and the party system, since it could also
be seen as making them more responsive to social change.
Towards a Better Understanding of the Relation between
Direct Democracy and Political Parties
This paper’s empirical test in the 26 Swiss cantons makes it clear that direct
democracy matters for political parties. But the widespread thesis that direct
democracy weakens parties can, in this generalized form, not be maintained.
Political parties are not universally weaker in cantons with an extensive use
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of referendums and initiatives. On the contrary, direct democracy seems to
go hand in hand with more professional and formalized party organizations.
However, it is true that party systems in more direct democratic cantons are
more fragmented and volatile than elsewhere, that smaller parties get a
larger share of the vote, and that the influence of political parties seems to
be lower in cantons with an extensive use of direct democracy. Neverthe-
less, we have to be careful about assigning causation in these relations. The
use of direct democracy could also be a product of well-organized and influ-
ential parties in a competitive and volatile multi-party system.
However, trying to estimate the influence of direct democracy on political
parties confronts us with serious methodological problems. First of all, there
is the question of how to measure party strength. As our results show, differ-
ent aspects of party strength are affected differently by direct democracy. It
is therefore essential to specify what is meant by party strength. To establish
an overall index of party strength that can be used for comparative analyses
seems to us rather problematic. Second, clear concepts for measuring direct
democracy are missing. Is it, for example, the institutional provisions or their
effective use that makes a political system more directly democratic? In this
paper we have argued that effective use is more important in influencing and
shaping political actors. Third, there is the problem of how to approach these
questions comparatively. The Swiss cantons seem to be a good area for
research, as the cantonal parties are relatively autonomous and they differ in
terms of direct democracy. But what about the effects at the national level?
At present, an empirical analysis of this kind at the national level seems
almost impossible, as there are hardly enough comparable cases. 
Our analysis has additional shortcomings when it comes to causal
interpretations. What is sometimes presented as evidence of influence is, of
course, statistically nothing more than a coincidence. We are inclined to
accept that direct democracy leads to a fragmented party system and we are
able to provide good arguments, but theoretically it could also be the
number of parties that has led to more extensive use of direct democracy.
Here, a historical approach would be more appropriate. And as far as our
analytical model is concerned, it is far from being exhaustive. Some vari-
ables are missing, such as the degree of inclusiveness of the consociational
government, and indirect effects are neglected. In addition, it is impossible
to factor in the original effects of direct democracy that made power-sharing
and pre-parliamentary negotiations part of the political process.
Further and more thorough research is doubtless needed to determine the
real influence of direct democracy on political parties. Nevertheless, this
study makes it clear that in the Swiss case at least, direct democracy should
not automatically be held responsible for comparatively weak parties, at
least as far as organizational aspects are concerned. Other and better expla-
nations have to be found, such as social and cultural heterogeneity and
cross-cutting cleavages, together with very strong federalism and the system
of consociationalism. 
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Appendix
Table A1. Correlation matrix ‘party strength’ (Pearson correlation coefficients)
Party affili- Perceived Strength of non-
Formal- Local party Professional- Party ates in local party governmental Fractional-
ization organizations ization membership executives influence parties ization Volatility
Formalization 1.00 .08 .21 .42 –.14 .06 .56 .54 .56
Local party organ. .08 1.00 .36 –.04 .84 .92 .22 –.25 .21
Professionalization .21 .36 1.00 –.12 .26 .56 .59 .48 .54
Party membership .42 –.04 –.12 1.00 –.24 –.06 –.25 –.01 –.16
Party affiliates in
local executives –.14 .84 .26 –.24 1.00 .80 .13 –.28 .08
Party influence .06 .92 .56 –.06 .80 1.00 .26 –.18 .25
Non-governmental
parties .56 .22 .59 –.25 .13 .26 1.00 .68 .86
Fractionalization .54 –.25 .48 –.01 –.28 –.18 .68 1.00 .68
Volatility .56 .21 .54 –.16 .08 .25 .86 .68 1.00
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Notes
This is a revised version of the paper prepared for the 25th ECPR Joint Sessions in
Bern, 27 February–4 March 1997, workshop No. 7 ‘Plebiscitary Politics and
Political Parties’. We are especially grateful to both organizers, Susan Scarrow and
Pat Seyd, who encouraged us to consider our data under the above aspects and made
many important suggestions concerning this final version. We also would like to
thank all participants of the workshop and the two anonymous reviewers for their
critical and helpful comments.
1 Accordingly, the number of publications on direct democracy has increased
considerably (see for example Kobach, 1993; Suksi, 1993; Möckli, 1994; Butler
and Ranney, 1994; Luthardt, 1994; Hamon, 1995; Budge, 1996; Gallagher and
Uleri, 1996).
2 Mainly responsible for the increase in the use of referendums is Switzerland, and
to a lesser extent Egypt and Italy. In the great majority of countries there has
been no significant increase (Butler and Ranney, 1994: 4).
3 For Germany see, for example, Alemann (1996: 7f.) and Evers (1991: 8); for the
UK see The Economist (21 Dec. 1996).
4 The most systematic and influential analysis of the functions of the Swiss refer-
endum is doubtlessly Neidhart (1970). Newer, although hardly empirical, publi-
cations on direct democracy in Switzerland that should be mentioned include
Kobach (1993), Papadopulos et al. (1994), Möckli (1994) and the correspond-
ing chapters in Linder (1994), Kriesi (1995), and Brunetti and Straubhaar (1996).
5 The first canton with such rights and political parties founded early was the
canton of St Gallen, followed by the cantons of Baselland, Lucerne, Wallis,
Waadt and Bern. The movement for an increase in democratic rights reached its
peak in the 1860s, when this struggle led to the foundation of left-wing parties,
which in various cantons took the name ‘Democratic party’ (Gruner, 1964: 275).
6 Of course, it could also be argued that this can be functional for the parties, since
it offers party members more choice. A party member can either agree with the
position of the cantonal party or that of the national party. 
7 The former party secretary of the FDP, Christian Kauter, for example, complains
that between 1972 und 1993 Swiss political parties had to lead 181 information
campaigns in the course of referendums and initiatives as well as five national
electoral campaigns (Kauter, 1996: 5f.)
8 Prior to the electoral success of the LdU, the National Right (NA) and new left
and green parties, for example, they had established themselves with more or less
successful initiative or referendum campaigns (Kriesi, 1986: 338). 
9 The recent success of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) is partly due to its clear
position in 1992 – compared to its bourgeois political partners, the Radical
Democrats (FDP) and the Christian Democrats (CVP) – against Switzerland
joining the European Economic Area (EEA) (see Ladner, 1993: 552).
10 Only about 16% of Swiss communities have a parliament (see Ladner, 1991: 82).
In the remainder, citizens come together several times a year in a community
meeting to decide on the political issues in question.
11 ‘Citizens initiatives’ also exist in the Landsgemeindekantone Appenzell-AI,
Glaris, Nidwalden and Obwalden (see Moser, 1985: 52).
12 According to this classification, the cantons BE, LU, UR, OW, NW, GL, ZG, SO,
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BS, BL, SH, AR, AI, AG, VD, GE, JU are considered more democratic and the
cantons ZH, SZ, FR, SG, GR, TG, TI, VS, NE less democratic (see Feld and
Savioz, 1996: 7, based on Weck-Hannemann and Pommerehne, 1996). 
13 On 1 December 1996, the canton of Nidwalden (NW) abolished the Lands-
gemeinde. In the canton of Obwalden (OW) a similar proposal was expected to
be put to the vote in 1998. 
14 For more about Landsgemeinde-Demokratien see, for example, Möckli (1987).
15 The discussion of whether this form of assembly democracy is the most far-
reaching form of direct democracy is futile. On the one hand, there are good
reasons to question the capacities of this model. First of all, obvious limits to this
form of legislative decision-making are given by the size of the cantons. The
bigger a canton the more difficult it is to bring the people together to discuss and
decide. Therefore, second, the normal participation rates are much lower. And
third, the ballots are usually not secret, which in some eyes violates a basic
general principle of democracy (see for example Luhmann, 1983: 159ff.). On the
other hand, an assembly is the place where people can express their political will
directly without the aid of intermediate organizations and are still able to
influence the questions being put to a decision during the decision process.
16 Although Kriesi and Wisler (1996: 24) argue with the entry price of direct
democracy, by ignoring a few exceptions they eventually stick to a distinction
between German-speaking cantons and the French/Italian-speaking ones.
17 Correlations considered important are printed in bold letters to make it easier
for the reader to locate the numbers discussed in the text. We are especially
grateful to Dirk Strohmann of the Année politique suisse at the Institute of
Political Science at the University of Bern, who kindly provided us with the data.
18 Since our data cover the universe of all Swiss cantons, there is no reason to add
significance levels. Nevertheless, only the stronger correlations are taken into
consideration. A correlation of .40 would be significant on a 0.05 level, correla-
tions of .52 and higher on a 0.001 level.
19 This result raises questions about the widespread idea that the French- and
Italian-speaking cantons are less inclined to use direct democratic means of
participation than the German-speaking ones.
20 If we use for our analyses entry hurdles of institutional provisions, at the very
best we will find that there are no important correlations between direct
democracy and party strength. 
21 The data on the cantonal parties and party systems come from four different
research projects: a survey of the communal secretaries of all Swiss communities
conducted in 1988 at the Institute of Sociology at the University of Zurich (see
Ladner, 1991), a survey of the presidents of about 5500 local parties, conducted
in 1990 at the same institute and financed by the Swiss National Fund (see Geser
et al., 1994), and another survey of the communal secretaries conducted at the
same Institute in 1994 and also financed by the Swiss National Fund. In addition
there is a recent research project on Swiss political parties, once more financed
by the Swiss National Fund and based at the Institute of Political Science at the
University of Bern.
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